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*DTR trip (1956)*

OPERATIONS SCHOOL

NOTES OF DTR'S TRIP

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## OPERATIONS SCHOOL

### Notes of DTR's Trip of Interest to the Operations School

- I. Extent and effectiveness of training done in Europe, Southern Europe, the Near East, Southeast Asia, and the Far East.
  - X A. Magnitude of training effort
  - B. Three categories of training 25X1A
    - 1. Security [REDACTED]
    - 2. Liaison services in FI, PP activities
    - 3. C/O agent training in safehouses
  - C. General effectiveness of training done overseas
  - X D. Use of military officers as instructors
  - E. Need for qualified Agency instructors
    - 1. Level of competency of current crop of instructors
    - X 2. Language qualifications
    - X 3. Directed assignment of instructors
    - X 4. Action cadre potential to help meet instructor needs
  - F. Propriety of CIA performing large scale military training
- II. Adequacy of the training of staff personnel
  - A. C/O reasonably well trained
  - X B. Breakdown of compartmentation in the field; its effect on OTR

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C. Training of support personnel

1. Tradecraft training of clerks and stenographers

X 2. Functional training of support personnel falling short of goal

X D. Liaison training and language training for case officers

X E. Increasing emphasis on agent training responsibilities of the case officer

F. Need for greater emphasis in our training

X 1. CE techniques

X 2. Reporting

a. Informational

b. Operational contact reporting

3. Field project outlines

a. Divisions will talk down

b. Use [REDACTED] as guide

X 4. Tradecraft for communication operations officers

X 5. Criteria and standardized procedures for reporting physical description and observation

X 6. Anti surveillance methods

III. Overseas training sites

X [REDACTED]

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25X1A



X IV. Planning for hot war

25X1A

A. Relationship of current operations to H/W planning in



25X1A



B. General confusion in most areas

C. Training implications of war planning

1. Training sites (where, when and how much)
2. Lack of requirements
3. Guidance on how to proceed

X



25X1A

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VI. Training support

A. Qualified instructor personnel

1. Directed assignments to OTR
2. Desires of many to serve in OTR

B. Material needs

1. Requests which never reach OTR
2. CI staff action
3. Branch action
4. Potential supply of linguists to translate material

VII. Personnel problems

- X A. Desire for directed assignments
- X B. Desire for training
- C. Training representation or representatives in the field

VIII. [REDACTED] conferences

A. [REDACTED] training

1. Proposed transfer of program to the U. S.
  - a. Factors militating against
  - b. Major [REDACTED] training activity
2. CIA representation objectives
  - a. To sell concept of joint effort only

B. [REDACTED]

1. Purpose:

To provide tailored training of up to three groups  
(35 persons per group) at one time and in specific

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**25X1A**

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25X1A

XIV. [REDACTED]

- A. Station pleased with [REDACTED] training
- B. Currently no major training activity requiring support

25X1A

25X1A

XV. [REDACTED]

A. Training a major station function

25X1A

- 1. [REDACTED] result of Joint Country Plan (on file in division and available to OTR)

25X1A

- a. To organize, equip and train an elite corps as an RO nucleus

- b. Phase I completed - selection and assessment

- c. Phase II to begin in July; to train over a four year period [REDACTED] as basic training cadre to do subsequent training throughout [REDACTED] under CIA supervision during last two years, cutting basic T/O in half

25X1A

- X d. T/O of 20, ten of which are training types

- e. Close relationship= maximum exploitation

- f. To date, entire operation has been filmed; subsequent operations to be filmed and made available to OTR for training film

- X g. Need for qualified FI C/O to do [REDACTED] training; replacements for 1957 and 1958 now being considered

25X1A

25X1A

2. [REDACTED]

- a. Support minimal - [REDACTED] presence should satisfy personnel needs

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25X1A

[REDACTED]

a. A modest thing requiring minimum amount of support

25X1A

XVI. [REDACTED]

25X1A

X A. [REDACTED] support

1. To train local service in basic tradecraft, audio surveillance, reporting

a. Effect of recent election on this plan

25X1A

XVII. [REDACTED]

25X1C

A. [REDACTED] and cutting down to 12 CIA officers

1. A minimum of 18 very good officers would suffice

2. Station to develop forecast of minimum personnel requirements

B. Monotype to become primarily an ICA function

1. A self sustaining program in past - developed own material

2. CIA support only will reduce exploitation

C. The training activity

[REDACTED]

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X D. Political aspects causing [REDACTED] program to fold - our training wasted 25X1A

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G. No anticipated requirement for training dependent FI Ops personnel outside country

1. Local training, if spotting program successful, will require personnel support

25X1A  
2.

a. Calibre of training irregular

b. Singleton training of high level types not satisfactory; use [REDACTED] for this

25X1A  
c. Plan better screening hereafter, need interpreters, will send qualified C/O with groups to be trained

d. Plan to surface these groups to government, if not surfaced, 3 groups (about 25 bodies will require training)

25X1A  
XIX.

X  
A. Status of maritime operations in the Far East

1. Need for adequately trained Maritime personnel

B. Favorable reaction to [REDACTED] training

25X1C

25X1A  
1. [REDACTED] not applicable

25X1A  
C. [REDACTED] work on investigation and surveillance teams

1. One team, trained and at work already debriefed

a. Debriefing (on tape, substance for a potential manual on subject)

25X1A

D. Junior Intelligence Service personnel to be trained [REDACTED]

with support [REDACTED]

25X1A

1. Station vague as to needs

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25X1A XX. [REDACTED]

25X1A A. [REDACTED] Joint Intelligence School for 24 selected [REDACTED] Army, 25X1C

Navy and Marines

- X 1. Continuing [REDACTED] support requirement for tradecraft and Maritime training on TDY [REDACTED] basis

25X1A

B. Basic War Plan envisions training and organization of Stay-behind nuclei

1. Station objects to War Planning on grounds it is done on theater level rather than base level

2. Envisions War Planning roll that of joint training with U. S. military in [REDACTED] to prepare [REDACTED] UW Force under SOFFE (Special Operations Force, Far East) as specialist teams to hit 125 targets in 65 areas when war comes

25X1A

3. Wartime training to be done closer home using [REDACTED] support

25X1A

4. Requirements still not firm, but anticipate need for minimum of 65 multi-purpose trainees per year; lucky if they get 5

- X 5. Current need is C/O who can do essential training under a professional training officer supervision

25X1A C. [REDACTED] not of immediate concern

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25X1A

XXI. [REDACTED]

X

A. Station objective to get into picture immediately in order to provide professional support and guidance to War Planners.

1. No training plans; feel that no GW groups will be trained for Far East for at least one year after war begins

25X1A

2. [REDACTED] as their fall back area

25X1A

3. [REDACTED] for training singleton and doubletons

25X1A

B. [REDACTED] a staging area for trainees to [REDACTED]

25X1A

25X1A

1. [REDACTED] reaction

25X1A

X

C. [REDACTED] installation; placement of OTR representation

25X1A

XXII. [REDACTED]

A. Drastic cut in GW load; new Special Forces Program to counter-balance

1. Station has three safehouses; [REDACTED]

25X1A

a. C/O-agent type of training

X

b. Five Training slots filled with no training officers assigned.

2. Anticipate step up in Staybehind training for hot war

a. Case officers qualified to perform task

X

b. Require one (at least) professional training officer to provide training guidance and supervision for qualified C/O

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~~X~~ B. Special Forces Training

1. Select, train and place in 24 target areas [REDACTED] 25X1A

a. Emphasis on train, retain, retrain

2. Screening, et al to be done [REDACTED] 25X1A

a. Further screening to be done [REDACTED] 25X1A

25X1A 3. [REDACTED]

25X1A C. [REDACTED] to recruit in SEA for FI purposes in 3rd countries

1. To be trained [REDACTED] 25X1A

D. [REDACTED] 25X1C

E. U. S. nationals to be recruited and trained on the spot.

25X1A XXIII. [REDACTED]

A. Current C/O assets sufficient to meet current training requirements

25X1A B. Concur in [REDACTED] training plans

25X1A C. Support to [REDACTED]

XXIV. Training Support

A. Material

~~X~~ 1. Basic Agent Training Manual (Foreign Language Issues)

~~X~~ 2. Glossary of Intelligence Terminology (Foreign Language Issues)

~~X~~ 3. Accession Lists - Inventory of Training Materials

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25X1A

X B. Long Term Schedules

X C. World Communism training overseas; [REDACTED]

25X1A

D. Reporting on Training matters

E. Potential requirements for deep cover training in the U. S.

25X1A

X 1. Use of [REDACTED] for training foreigners

25X1A

2. [REDACTED] - anticipated but not firm; 16 - 22 [REDACTED] f25X1A  
staybehind training to include Air Ops, caching, E & E,  
S/W and finger printing

25X1A

3. [REDACTED] staybehind training for late fall

25X1A

4. [REDACTED] staybehind training for 4 - 5 trainees per year,  
planned recruitment of [REDACTED] students in U. S. may 25X1A  
project a requirement

25X1A

5. Potential [REDACTED] requirement for training three shipping

25X1A

[REDACTED] clandestine intelligence; anticipate six persons  
in the near future (3 in June - July) (3 in September) for  
high level tradecraft training.

25X1A

6. VIP [REDACTED] to be trained in late summer

25X1A

E. [REDACTED] to regularly report in detail on all training done at

25X1A

25X1A

1. [REDACTED] instructor personnel to case officer each training  
project

a. Station C/O to do preliminary screening at country of  
origin

b. Instructors will go to stations for briefing and area  
orientation

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2. [REDACTED] desires all OTR lesson plans
  - a. World Communism of special interest
3. Need for single men who can travel

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LANGUAGE AND EXTERNAL TRAINING SCHOOL

NOTES ON DTR'S TRIP OF INTEREST TO LETS

- I. General recognition of need for language capability
  - A. Needs vs current capabilities and rate of training
  - B. Directed language training assignment; its impact on intensive language training
- II. Desirable proficiency levels
  - A. Case Officers
  - B. Instructors
  - C. Support Officers
  - D. Jr. Admin Personnel
- III. Case Officer Language Training at headquarters
- IV. Language Training overseas
  - A. Extent of Program
  - B. Station supervision and management
  - C. Aptitude testing prior to departure overseas
  - D. Availability of language training materials
- V. Policy to ensure greatest benefits from long term language study
- VI. Field Suggestions
  - A. Language Training for Commo Ops Officers as part of [REDACTED] Training
  - B. Develop a "Key Word" system of language identification

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1. Lists
2. Tapes for sounds

- C. Inclusion, in greater detail in Agency language programs, standardized intelligence terminology in language concerned
- D. Develop a system of foreign flags identification

VII. Specific Requirements

- A. Adequacy of French in NEA in lieu of more difficult local languages
- B. [REDACTED] 2 or 3 C/O regularly enrolled in long term language training with remainder acquiring working knowledge
- C. [REDACTED]

25X1A

VIII. Potential native speaking instructors from [REDACTED] lists.

25X1A

IX. Interest in external management training and other external training possibilities.

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